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CONTINUING CONFUSION IN THE DEFINITION
OF A SECURITY: THE SALE OF BUSINESS
DOCTRINE, DISCRETIONARY TRADING ACCOUNTS,
AND OIL, GAS AND MINERAL INTERESTS
For decades courts and commentators have labored to interpret the
definition of a security under federal securities laws.1 Although the
Securities Act of 19332 ('33 Act) and the Securities Exchange Act of 19343
('34 Act) define a security, courts often have vacillated in determining
' See, e.g., Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 555-61, 560 n.11 (1982) (federal statutes'
broad definition of security requires courts to analyze and evaluate each transaction and
instrument alleged a security); SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 351 (1943)
(courts may find that both commonplace and novel instruments and devices constitute
securities); SEC v. Aqua-Sonic Products Corp., 687 F.2d 577, 584-85 (2d Cir.) (courts inter-
preting definition of security must look past legal terminology and must consider totality
of circumstances surrounding transaction), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 568 (1982); SEC v. Glenn
W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482-83 (9th Cir.) (modifying earlier interpreta-
tions of definition of security) cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973); Newton, What Is A Security:
A Critical Analysis, 48 Miss. L.J. 167, 167 (1977) (definition of security harbors ambiguity);
Note, When Is A Security Not A Security? Promissory Notes, Loan Participants, and Stock
In Close Corporations, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1123, 1123-24, 1124 nn.3-4 (1982) (discussion
of Supreme Court decisions and commentators expressing uncertainty involved in defining
a security) [hereinafter cited as When Is A Security Not A Security]; see also infra text ac-
companying notes 19-80, 84-177 (varying Supreme Court and lower court analyses for defin-
ing a security).
2 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1976). The Securities Act of 1933 ('33 Act) defines a secur-
ity as follows:
When used in this subchapter, unless the context otherwise requires-
The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture,
evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing
agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization'certificate or subscription,
transferable, share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of
deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral
rights, or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a "secur-
ity," or any certificate or interest or participation in, temporary or interim cer-
tificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warranty or right to subscribe to or pur-
chase, any of the foregoing.
Id. at § 77b(1).
3 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976). The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ('34 Act) defines
a security as follows:
When used in this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires-
The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture,
certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement or in any
oil, gas, or other mineral royalty or lease, any collateral-trust certificate,
preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment con-
tract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit, for a security, or in general,
any instrument commonly known as a "security," or any certificate of interest
or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, or warrant
or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing; but shall not include
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the scope of enumerated terms and general interests4 within the Acts'
definition' of a security.' Definitional certainty is important for issuers
of and traders in an instrument that could constitute a security because
failure to register a security, absent a registration exemption,' and failure
currency or any note, draft bill of exchange, or banker's acceptance which has
a maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding nine months, exclusive of
days of grace, or any renewal thereof the maturity of which is likewise limited.
Id. at S 78c(10).
1 See 15 U.S.C. S 77b(1) (1976) ('33 Act definition of security); id. S 78c(10) (34 Act
definition of a security). Both the '33 Act and the '34 Act divide the definition of a security
into two parts. Id. SS 77b(1), 78c(10). Enumerated terms such as notes, stocks, bonds, and
debentures, comprise the first part of the definition. Id. §§ 77b(1), 78c(10). The definition's
second part includes general instruments or interests, such as investment contracts, cer-
tificates of interest, transferable shares, interests, participations, or rights in any item that
commonly constitutes a "security:' Id. SS 77b(1), 78c(10).
The Supreme Court has categorized the enumerated terms of the Acts' definition
of a security as terms falling within "the ordinary concept of a security." See Marine Bank
v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 555-61 (1982) (citing precedents categorizing specific terms as in-
struments ordinarily and commonly considered securities). Conversely, the Court has
described the general instruments and interests in the Acts' definition of a security as
unusual instruments constituting securities. See id. at 559-60 (unique agreement may con-
stitute security if agreement contains characteristics common to security); see also infr
text accompanying notes 20-91 (Supreme Court's differing analyses to determine whether
an instrument is a security under the Acts' enumerated terms or general instruments and
interests). Commentators have adopted varying descriptive names for the terms and in-
terests of the Acts' definition of a security. See, e.g., Diiport, Restoring Balance to the Defini-
tion of a Security, 10 SEC. REG. L.J. 99, 102-03 (1982) (Acts' definition of a security contains
enumerated terms, catchall phases, and interests or participation in interests); FitzGibbon,
What Is A Securty?-A Redefinition Based Upon Eligibility To Participate In The Financial
Markets, 64 MINN. L. REV. 893, 896-98 (1980) (Acts contain both categories of securities and
"elastic" clauses which may constitute securities "unless context otherwise requires"); When
Is A Security Not A Security?, supra note 1, at 1125, 1131 (Acts include both enumerated
instruments and generic terms commonly considered securities).
I See United Hous. Found. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 847 n.12 (1975) ('33 Act and '34
Act provide virtually identical definitions of a security); S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.
14 (1934) ('33 Act and '34 Act definitions substantially identical), reprinted in 5 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, at 14 (1973);
see also supra notes 2 & 3 (Acts' definition of security).
6 See Ivan Allen Co. v. United States, 422 U.S. 617, 642-43 (1975) (Powell, J., dissent-
ing) (Supreme Court's ambiguous use of term "security" creates uncertainty); Carney &
Fraser, Defining A "Security": Georgia's Struggle With The "Risk Capital" Test, 30 EMORY
L.J. 73, 73-76 (1981) (federal courts' failure to define a security presents insufficient guidance
for future analysis of items that may constitute a security); supra note 1 (federal courts'
use of differing analyses creates definitional uncertainty); see also infra text accompanying
notes 20-91 (discussion of differing analyses for determining whether specific terms and
various interests fall within definition of security).
' See 15 U.S.C. S§ 77f-77j (1976) (registration regulations); id. SS 77c(a), 77d (exempt
transactions). The '33 Act requires registration with the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (SEC) of the original offering of a security, unless an exemption is available. See id.
§§ 77c(a), 77d (listing exempted securities and transactions); see also § 78c(12) ('34 Act ex-
emption from compliance with regulations once security issued).
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to follow specific regulations for issuing' and trading9 may result in civil
and criminal sanctions."0 An examination of cases considering the
enumerated term "stock"", however, reveals definitional uncertainty
among courts examining the security status of stock transferred during
the sale of a business.12 An examination of cases considering whether a
discretionary trading account"3 constitutes a security reveals varying in-
terpretations of the scope of general interests4 within the Acts' defini-
tion of a security. 5 Similar definitional uncertainty occurs among cases
considering whether fractional oil, gas, and other mineral interests" con-
' See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(4) (1976) ('33 Act definition of issuer); id. S 78c(8) ('34 Act defini-
tion of issuer}, id. §§ 77f-77j (registration regulations). The '34 Act states that the issuer
of a security, as well as persons involved with the security's continuous management, may
be subject to reporting, proxy, tender offer, and insider trading regulations unless an ex-
emption is available. See id. § 781 (registration requirements); id. § 78m (periodic reports);
id. § 78n (proxy requirements); id. § 78q (record and report requirements); id. 5 78r (respon-
sibility for misleading statements); see also id. S 78c(12) (defining exempted security).
' See id. § 78c(a(4)-(5) (defining broker and dealer). Brokers, dealers, and others trading
in securities may be subject to regulation under the '34 Act. Id. § 78f (requirements for
membership in national securities exchanges); id. § 78g (margin requirements); id. S 78h
(borrowing and lending restrictions); id. §§ 78i-78j (1976) (manipulation restrictions); id. S
78k (trading restrictions); id. § 78o(1)-(4) (broker and dealer registration and regulations).
11 Id. §§ 77a-77bbbb ('33 Act); id. SS 78a-78kk (1976) ('34 Act). The '33 Act sanctions
every person preparing, certifying, signing, or having any connection with a registration
statement, prospectus, or other communication involving a security. See id. 5 77k (civil
liabilities resulting from false registration statement). The '33 Act also sanctions any per-
son who offers or sells a security by any means that misstates or omits a material fact
necessary to make certain that statements about the security are not misleading. Id. S 771
(civil liabilities for prospectus and communications irregularities); see also id. § 77o (liability
of persons controlling those persons who are liable under §§ 77k & 771).
Both the '33 and '34 Acts contain antifraud provisions. Id. § 78q(a) (fraudulent interstate
transactions); id. §§ 78j(b), 78n(e), 78o(c)(1) ('34 Act antifraud provisions prohibiting
manipulative practices, untrue statements, and omissions). The '34 Act imposes criminal
penalties for willful violations of the Acts. See id. S 78ff(a)-(c) ('34 Act criminal sanctions).
" See id. § 77b(1) ('33 Act definition of security includes the term "stock"); id. § 78c(10)
('34 Act definition of security specifically lists the term "stock"); see also supra note 4 (Acts
divided into enumerated terms and general interests).
" See infra notes 157-77 and accompanying text (definition and discussion of sale of
business doctrine).
" See infra text accompanying notes 126-56 (defining discretionary trading account).
" See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1976) ('33 Act definition of security lists general interests);
id. § 78c(10) ('34 Act definition of security includes general interests); see also supra note
4 (Acts divide definition of security into enumerated terms and general interests).
"S See infra notes 127-28 and accompanying text (defining discretionary trading ac-
count); infra notes 130-31 and accompanying text (horizontal commonality approach for deter-
mining whether discretionary trading account constitutes security); infra notes 132-33 and
accompanying text (vertical commonality approach for determining whether discretionary
trading account constitutes security).
1 See infra note 92 and accompanying text ('33 Act and '34 Act definitions include
oil, gas, and mineral interests); see also supra notes 2 & 3 ('33 and '34 Acts, definitions of
security).
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stitute a security within either the specific terms or general interests of
the definition of a security."1
Definitional confusion has resulted from courts' use of several analyses
to determine the scope of terms and interests within the Acts' definition
of a security. 8 Although a few courts have found that an instrument or
interest constitutes a security simply because the instrument or interest
is listed by the Acts, 9 the Supreme Court has rejected a literal inter-
pretation of the definition of a security."0 Instead, the Court has followed
a functional approach that analyzes the "economic realities" of an instru-
ment or interest.
2'
17 See infra notes 92-125 and accompanying text (defining and discussing oil, gas, and
mineral interests); see also supra notes 2 & 3 ('33 and '34 Acts' definitions of security in-
clude both oil, gas, and other mineral interests and investment contract).
"S See infra notes 20-91 and accompanying text (Supreme Court analyses for determin-
ing whether instrument or interest constitutes security); infra notes 93-125 and accompa-
nying text (courts generally apply two different analyses to determine whether oil, gas,
or other mineral interest constitutes security); infra notes 129-33, 140-44 and accompanying
text (discretionary trading account case analysis varies among courts); infra notes 157-77
and accompanying text (differing analyses followed by courts considering sale of business
doctrine). Commentators have noted that the varying interpretations of the definition of
a security may lead to confusion for courts considering the security status of an instrument
or interest in the future. See Dillport, supra note 4, at 119-20 (court interpretations of statutory
definition of a security undermine certainty); FitzGibbon, supra note 4, at 895 (lack of clear
standards for determining what is a security leaves courts, commentators, businessmen,
and government agencies in doubt about definitional parameters).
19 See Seagrave Corp. v. Vista Resources, Inc., 696 F.2d 227, 230 (2d Cir. 1982) (literal
approach followed to find stock a security unless instrument lacks ordinarily accepted at-
tributes of stock); Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F.2d 1139, 1143-45 (2d Cir. 1982) (conventional
stock is a security on its face, regardless of underlying transaction); Coffin v. Polishing
Machines, Inc., 596 F.2d 1202, 1204 (4th Cir.) (court does not have to analyze the substance
of ordinary corporate stock unless the stock does not have significant characteristics typically
associated with the term "stock"), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 868 (1979); Exchange Nat'l Bank
v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126, 1137-38 (2d Cir. 1976) (establishing new literalism
and finding that unsecured subordinated notes constituted securities under language of
the Acts). But see, e.g., Union Planters Nat'l Bank v. Commercial Credit Business Loans,
Inc., 651 F.2d 1174, 1180 & n.7 (6th Cir. 1981) (literal inclusion of participation within Acts'
definition of security is not dispositive of loan participation's security status), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1124 (1981); Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 426 (5th Cir. 1981) (rejecting literal
reliance upon wording of Acts for functional approach to determine that promissory notes
financing sale of property did not constitute securities), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981);
Great Western Bank & Trust v. Kotz, 532 F.2d 1252, 1256 (9th Cir. 1976) (courts should
not interpret statutory definitions literally); infra notes 20-91 and accompanying text (Supreme
Court rejects literal approach for more functional economic realities approach).
'o See United Hous. Found. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 848 (1975) (rejecting idea that
all stock must be a security because the term "stock" appears in the statutory definition
of a security); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967) (courts considering meaning
and scope of "security" should disregard form and look to substance of a particular instru-
ment or interest); accord SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298, 301 (1946) (broad defini-
tion of security embodies flexible standard emphasizing economic realities instead of form).
" See Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 556-60 (1982) (applying functional economic
1258 [Vol. 40:1255
DEFINING A SECURITY
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ECONOMIC REALITIES TEST
The Supreme Court established the foundation for the economic
realities test in SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp.' The Joiner Court noted
that courts considering the scope of the Acts' definition of a security should
construe the definition to conform with the Acts' general purpose.' The
Court further noted that courts should read the Acts' text according to
the context of each case,24 and interpret the Acts' words to carry out
legislative policy.' The Joiner Court added that the term "security" can
realities approach to determine that certificate of deposit and unique loan guaranty were
not securities, International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 558 (1979) (applying
flexible economic realities approach to determine that compulsory, noncontributory pen-
sion plan was not an investment contract); United Hous. Found. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837,
847-49, 851-52 (1975) (disregarding form of stock to determine that economic realities of
underlying transaction did not exhibit security characteristics of either stock or invest-
ment contract); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336-45 (1967) (withdrawable capital share
in savings and loan association is security because in substance, share exhibited security
characteristics of investment contract and of stock); SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co.,
387 U.S. 202, 211 (1967) (accumulation provisions of flexible annuity constitute investment
contract because of fund's character in commerce); SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293,
299-301 (1946) (establishing flexible investment contract test to uncover economic realities
of citrus grove development offer); SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 352-53
(1943) (considering oil lease's character in commerce to determine security status).
2 320 US. 344 (1943). In Joiner, the Supreme Court considered whether assignments
of oil leases constituted securities under the '33 Act. Id. at 345, 350-54.
1 Id. at 350-51. The Joiner Court stated that Congress intended the securities laws
to end the evils of fraud inherent in speculative trading of instruments constituting securities.
Id. at 349; see infra note 25 (considerations behind legislative purposes for securities laws).
1 320 U.S. at 351. In Joiner, promoters of an oil lease assignment sales campaign adver-
tised the purchase of a lease as an investment. Id. at 346-47. The Joiner Court considered
the oil lease assignments under the context of the sales campaign literature and held that
the leases were securities because the promoters represented the leases as speculative
investments. Id. at 349, 352-53, 355; see infra notes 121-25 (discussing Joiner as foundation
for defining fractional oil and gas interests as securities).
1 320 US. at 350-51. The Joiner Court concluded that the legislative policy underly-
ing the Acts was to reach any instrument or interest that becomes the subject of specula-
tion, no matter how unusual or unlike a security an instrument or interest seems to be.
See id. at 351-52 & n.10. The Court stressed in a later case that the legislative policy underly-
ing the securities laws was to afford broad protection to an investor. SEC v. W.J. Howey
Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946). Both Congress and President Franklin D. Roosevelt recog-
nized severe public harm caused by individuals and corporations engaging in unscrupulous
securities schemes during the 1920 post-war decade. See STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON IN-
TERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 73D CONG., 1ST SEss., REPORT ON SECURITIES ACT OF 1933,
reprinted in 4 B. Schwartz, THE ECONOMIC REGULATION OF BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY: A
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF U.S. REGULATORY AGENCIES, at 2573-76 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
STAFF REPORT]; President's Message to Congress Recommending Federal Supervision of In-
terstate Securities Traffic (March 29, 1933), reprinted in STAFF REPORT, supra, at 2573-74.
Both the President and Congress stressed that individuals and corporations bear an obliga-
tion to the buying public to disclose fully every essentially important element attending
the issue of a new security. STAFF REPORT. supra at 2574-75; see also FitzGibbon, supra note
4, at 912-18 (Acts adopted to restore investors' confidence in financial markets).
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envelope both instruments commonly considered securities28 and novel,
uncommon, or irregular instruments or interests.
The economic realities test requires a court to analyze an interest's
or an instrument's character in commerce by looking to the terms of the
offer, the plan of distribution, and the economic inducements held out to
a prospect. If the interest's or instrument's character in commerce falls
within "the ordinary concept of a security,"' the instrument or interest
constitutes a security.2 The Supreme Court has applied the economic
realities test to interpret both enumerated terms and general interests
included in the definition of a security.' The Court considered whether
an instrument bearing the label of the enumerated term "stock" constituted
a security in United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman.2
In Forman, the Court considered whether shares of stock in a non-
profit, government-subsidized housing project constituted a security under
the enumerated terms of the '33 and '34 Acts.3 The housing project stock
28 320 U.S. at 351. The Joiner Court stated that instruments such as bonds, stocks,
and notes were fairly standardized terms with well-settled meanings. Id.; see supra notes
2 & 3 ('33 and '34 Act definitions of a security).
2 320 U.S. at 351, 352 n.10. The Joiner Court emphasized that an instrument or in-
terest that ordinarily does not exhibit the characteristics of an investment, may later become
a security if the instrument or interest becomes the subject of speculation. Id. at 352 n.10.
Subjection of an instrument or interest to investment speculation is only one of the many
characteristics which fall within the ordinary concept of a security. See SEC v. W.J. Howey
Co., 328 U.S. 293, 300-01 (1946) (although speculative nature of agreement may be a
characteristic of a security, an agreement's speculative or nonspeculative nature becomes
immaterial once agreement satisfies Howey investment contract test); infra notes 54-56 (defin-
ing Howey test).
I Joiner, 320 U.S. at 352-53; see Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 556 (1982) (reaf-
firming the Joiner Court's factors for analyzing an instrument's or interest's character in
commerce); United Hous. Found. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 847-51 (1975) (economic realities
test requires court to disregard instrument's form and to scrutinize instrument's substance);
SEC v. W.J. Howey, 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946) (applying economic realities test to invest-
ment contract).
" 421 U.S. at 849-50. The "ordinary concept of a security" has become a term of art
including many types of instruments in the commercial world. See Marine Bank v. Weaver,
455 U.S. 551, 556 (1982) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1933)). The broad
statutory definition of a security excludes only currency and notes with a maturity of less
than nine months. 455 U.S. at 556; see supra notes 2 & 3 ('33 and '34 Act definitions of
a security).
320 U.S. at 351.
31 See, e.g., Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 556-59 (1982) (interpreting the
enumerated term "certificate of deposit" and the general interest "investment contract"
under the economic realities test); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551,
559-62 (1979) (considering whether a compulsory, noncontributory pension plan constitutes
an investment contract under the economic realities test); United Hous. Found. v. Forman,
421 U.S. 837, 847-51 (1975) (applying economic realities test to instruments labeled "stock");
see supra text accompanying notes 28-30 (defining economic realities test).
421 U.S. 837 (1975).
* Id. at 848-50. In Forman, the United Housing Foundation (UHF), a nonprofit member-
ship corporation, initiated and sponsored Co-op City, a government-subsidized housing pro-
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shares were not negotiable, conferred no voting rights, and could not ap-
preciate in value.' The Forman housing project shares were not available
to the general public, but only to qualified low-income applicants. 5 The
purchasers in Forman bought the stock to obtain low-cost personal hous-
ing, not to invest for profit." Refusing to let the form of the term "stock"
override the substance of the shares' particular characteristics, the For-
man Court emphasized that courts must examine the economic realities
underlying the named instrument for characteristics falling within the or-
dinary concept of a security." Although the Forman Court did not cite
Joiner, the Court applied the Joiner factors38 to ascertain the Forman
shares' character in commerce. 9 The Court held that the housing project
stock shares, regardless of their labeling, did not constitute a security
under the Acts because the Forman shares did not possess significant
characteristics typically associated with stock."
In 1982, the Supreme Court again applied the Joiner economic realities
factors to determine whether an instrument labeled certificate of deposit
was a security under the Acts' enumerated term "certificate of deposit.""'
ject for low-income persons. Id. at 841. To acquire an apartment in Co-op City, eligible per-
sons had to purchase shares of stock which represented rooms of an apartment. Id. at 841-42.
The shares were nontransferable because each share explicitly was connected with a par-
ticular apartment. Id at 842. UHF required a tenant moving out of Co-op City to sell back





See supra text accompanying notes 28-29 (Joiner factors).
421 U.S. at 851. Although the Forman Court did not cite to Joiner, the Court actually
applied the Joiner factors for ascertaining whether an instrument's or interest's character
in commerce falls within the ordinary concept of a security. See id.; supra notes 28-29 (Joiner
factors). The Forman shares of stock did not have the common characteristics of stock under
the terms of offer, the plan of distribution, and the plan of inducement offered to prospects.
421 U.S. at 851; see SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 352-53 (1943) (factors
for ascertaining instrument's character in commerce). First, the Formn shares' terms of
offer designated that the tenants could not negotiate, transfer, vote, pledge as security,
or mortgage the shares. 421 U.S. at 842-44, 851. Second, UHF's distribution plan for the
shares did not allow for public trading or for trading of the shares at all. Id at 842. Only
eligible low-income persons could buy Co-op City shares. Id. A tenant moving out could
sell the shares only to the agent for the project or to an eligible prospective tenant, and
only for the original cost of each share. Id. at 842-43. Finally, the only economic inducement
represented by Co-op City shares was low-cost housing. Id. The shares carried no invest-
ment or profit potential. Id. UHF did not advertise Co-op City as an investment oppor-
tunity. Id. at 841-42.
421 U.S. at 841-42; see supra notes 34-36, 39 and accompanying text (Co-op City shares
lack stock characteristics).
" See Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 556-59 (1982) (bank certificate of deposit
lacks security characteristics); supra notes 2 & 3 ('33 Act and '34 Act definition of security);
infra notes 43-49, 67-80 and accompanying text (Weaver Court considered not only whether
certificate of deposit constituted security, but also whether loan guaranty agreement con-
stituted investment contract).
1983]
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In Marine Bank v. Weaver,42 Mr. and Mrs. Weaver purchased a certificate
of deposit from Marine Bank and later pledged the certificate to the bank
to guaranty a loan for Columbus Packing Company." The Weaver Court
stated that in the Acts' definition of a security the term "certificate of
deposit, for a security" referred to instruments issued by protective com-
mittees during corporate organization.44 Unlike the long-term debt charac-
teristics of corporate certificates of deposit,45 the Weaver certificate of
deposit guaranteed payment in full"' and the holders of the certificate
received protection under the federal banking laws4 The Court reiterated
the Joiner Court's instruction that courts construe the Acts to conform
with congressional purposes, considering the context of an instrument's
offering and legislative policy.48 The Weaver Court held that the Joiner
factors comprise the test for ascertaining whether an instrument's
character in commerce falls within the ordinary concept of a security.49
The Supreme Court has stated that courts must consider the signifi-
cant characteristics of a security not only for common instruments, such
as stock or certificates of deposit, but also for uncommon instruments or
interests.5" The Court generally determines the security status of an un-
common instrument or interest by considering whether the instrument
or interest constitutes an investment contract under the general interests
listed by the Acts' definition of a security.5 The Court addressed whether
a novel, uncommon instrument was an investment contract in SEC v. W.J.
Howey Co.52 In Howey, the Court held "that the sale of land in a citrus
grove, coupled with contracts for management and development of the
42 455 U.S. 551 (1982).
Id. at 552-53; see infra notes 69, 74-76 and accompanying text (terms of loan guaranty
agreement between Weavers and Columbus Packing).
1, 455 U.S. at 557 & n.5; see supra notes 2 & 3 (definition of security under the Acts).
15 455 U.S. at 556-58, 557 n.6. The Weaver Court listed the characteristics of long-term
debt obligation certificates of deposit as affording profit potential based upon varying in-
terest rates and granting voting rights. Id. at 557-58.
46 Id. The Weaver Court stressed that the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation in-
sured payment of the bank certificate of deposit. Id.
I, Id. The Weaver Court stated that federal banking laws regulate and protect deposits
through reserve, reporting, and inspection requirements. Id.
41 Id. at 556; see supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text (Supreme Court instructions
for courts interpreting definition of a security).
41 455 U.S. at 556; see supra text accompanying notes 28-30 (Joiner factors of economic
realities test).
I See SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 351-53 (1943) (unusual instru-
ment's characteristics may fall within the ordinary concept of a security).
"' See, e.g., Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 559-60 (1982) (investment contract
interpreted as excluding unique loan guaranty agreement from scope of security defini-
tion); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 559-62 (1979) (compulsory
noncontributary pension plan does not constitute investment contract); SEC v. United Benefit
Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 202, 211 (1967) (accumulation provision of flexible annuity fund con-
stitutes investment contract).
328 U.S. 293 (1946).
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property, constituted investment contracts under the Acts' definition of
a security.5 The Howey Court defined an investment contract as requir-
ing an investment of money,' a common enterprise,55 and an expectation
of profits to come solely from the efforts of others.' Courts generally con-
sider the Howey investment contract test when determining whether any
interest or unusual instrument constitutes an investment contract."
SId. at 299-301. The Howey Court only considered the general term "investment con-
tract" within the '33 Act definition of a security. Id. at 297; see supra note 2 ('33 Act defini-
tion of a security). The Supreme Court later recognized, however, that the Howey test em-
bodied the necessary characteristics of all the Court's decisions defining a security. See
United Hous. Found. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 (1975) (recognizing no distinction between
test necessary to determine investment contract and other varying instruments or interests
commonly known as securities). But see International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S.
551, 558-62 (1979) (investment contract characteristics must be predominant for instrument
to be security).
11 See 328 U.S. at 298-99, 301 (first element of Howey investment contract test). The
Howey Court found that the W.J. Howey Company (Howey Company) and the Howey-in-
the-Hills Service, Inc., (Howey-in-the-Hills) offered investors an opportunity to invest money
and share in the profits derived from a large citrus fruit enterprise. Id. at 294-99. The Court
determined that the investors provided capital for the enterprise to cultivate, harvest, and
market citrus products. Id. at 295, 299-300. Thus, the Court held that the Howey investors
bad invested money and met the first element necessary to find an investment contract.
Id. at 300.
1 See id. at 299, 301 (second element of Howey investment contract test). The Howe'y
Court found that the Howey Company and Howey-in-the-Hills offered an .opportunity for
persons lacking equipment and experience in a citrus operation to invest and share in pro-
fits from the citrus enterprise while the Howey Company and Howey-in-the-Hills managed
and retained part ownership in the enterprise. Id. at 299-300. The Court found that investors
engaged in a common enterprise with the two companies because the investors helped finance
the companies' development and management of the citrus enterprise. Id. at 295, 299-300.
Thus, the Court held that the common citrus enterprise met the second element of the
investment contract test. Id. at 300.
56 See id. at 299, 301 (third element of Howey investment contract test). In Howey, most
investors lacked the experience and equipment necessary to develop and maintain a citrus
grove operation. Id. at 299-300. The Howey Company encouraged investors purchasing a
land sales contract to make service arrangements with Howey-in-the-Hills. Id. at 295. Once
investors entered into a service contract with Howey-in-the-Hills, the Howey Company had
full discretion and authority for cultivating, harvesting, and marketing the crops. Id. at
296. The Court held that the investors' profits were dependent upon the common enter-
prise managed by the two companies. Id. at 300. Therefore, the Court held that the citrus
grove sales contracts, warranty deeds, and service contracts met the third element of the
investment contract test, profits derived solely from the efforts of others. Id. at 300-01.
51 See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 558-62 (1979) (-owey
investment contract test applied to pension plan); United Hous. Found. v. Forman, 421 U.S.
837, 851-57 (1975) (whether shares of stock in nonprofit housing project constituted invest-
ment contract under Howey; Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 338-39 (1967) (Howey test
applied to withdrawable capital shares in savings and loan association).
Circuit courts, lower federal courts, and commentators generally recognize the iowey
test as the predominant test for determining an instrument's status as an investment con-
tract security. See, e.g., Mordaunt v. Incomco, 686 F.2d 815, 816-17 (9th Cir. 1982) (applica-
tion of Howey test to discretionary trading account); Coward v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., [1982
Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 98,784, at 94,020,94,024-25 (7th Cir., Aug. 16,1982)
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Although the Howey test has become the predominant approach
followed by courts considering whether an interest or unusual instrument
is an investment contract security,58 the Supreme Court has considered
whether an interest or unusual instrument is an investment contract
without applying the Howey test.59 In SEC v. United Benefit Life Insurance
Co. ,6 the Court applied Joiner to find that the accumulation provision of
a flexible annuity fund was an investment contract."' The United Benefit
Court found that the annuity fund's character in commerce was the
character of an investment contract because promoters offered the fund
to the general public as a professionally managed investment with growth
potential.2 The Court also found that the promoters offered the fund to
compete with offerings of mutual funds.' The United Benefit Court held
(applying Howey test to non-compulsory, contributory pension plan), Morrison v. Pelican
Landing Development Co. [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 98,863, at 94,480-81
(N.D. Ill., Aug. 20, 1982) (application of Howey test to land development general partnership
interests); Dillport, supra note 4, at 103 (Howey test is predominant test for determining
whether an instrument falls within general interest phrases of definition of security); Fitz-
Gibbon, supra note 4, at 898-901 (Howey test represents Supreme Court's leading effort
to develop guidelines for determining definition of security); see also supra notes 54-56 and
accompanying text (discussion of Howey test). Cf Ballard & Cordell Corp. v. Zoller & Dan-
neberg Exploration Ltd., 544 F.2d 1059, 1065-66 (10th Cir. 1976) (applying Howey test to
working interest in oil and gas lease but adding risk capital analysis for "efforts of others"
element), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 965 (1977).
5 See supra note 57 (Howey test generally recognized as predominant test for courts
determining investment contract security status). But see Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S.
551, 559-60 (1982) (partial application of Howey test); SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co.,
387 U.S. 202, 211 (1967) (finding investment contract without applying Howey test); infra
notes 59-63 and accompanying text (United Benefit Court's investment contract analysis);
infra notes 65-80 and accompanying text (Weaver Court's investment contract analysis);
infra notes 86-88 (modification of Howey test).
" See SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 202, 211 (1967) (applying Joiner
factors to determine investment contract characteristics).
60 Id.
1 Id. at 208-12. In United Benefit, the United Benefit Life Insurance Co. (United) publicly
offered an optional annuity plan known as the "Flexible Fund." Id. at 204. United invested
purchasers' premiums in common stocks to produce capital gains return as well as interest
return on the aggregate funds. Id. at 205-07. The purchasers' contracts contained a conven-
tional fixed dollar annuity clause. Id. at 205. Each contract alternatively guaranteed before
or at the annuity's maturity a minimum cash value ranging from fifty percent of the first
year's net premiums to one hundred percent after 10 years. Id. The Securities and Ex-
change Commission contended that the pre-maturity phase of the contract constituted a
security. Id. at 206. The United Benefit Court separated the pre-maturity period from the
post-maturity period to determine whether the pre-maturity period constituted an invest-
ment contract security. Id. at 207-09.
62 Id. at 208-11. The United Benefit Court found that the terms of the "Flexible Fund"
annuity contract offered United's services as an investment agency, allowing policyholders
to share in United's investment experience. Id. at 208; see SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp.,
320 U.S. 344, 352-53 (1943) (first step for ascertaining instrument's security character in
commerce is to consider terms of the instrument's offer).
' 387 U.S. at 211-12. The United Benefit Court stated that because United offered
Flexible Fund contracts as an investment alternative to mutual funds, Flexible Fund pur-
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that by offering the fund as an investment opportunity alternative to
mutual fund investment opportunities, United shaped the fund's character
as an investment contract."
Although the Court in United Benefit definitely disregarded Howey
and followed Joiner to find an investment contract,65 the Court in Marine
Bank v. Weaver"6 used both Howey and Joiner to distinguish an unusual
loan guaranty agreement from an investment contract.6 7 In Weaver, the
Weavers pledged a certificate of deposit68 to the bank to guaranty a loan
for Columbus Packing Company.69 The Court found that the loan guaranty
agreement did not fall within the ordinary concept of a security because
the private agreement in Weaver did not have the characteristics of an
investment contract. Following the Joiner Court's analysis, the Weaver
Court noted that offerings to a number of potential investors accompanied
plans to sell citrus grove interests in Howey
7' and oil leases in Joiner.72
chasers should receive the same advantages of disclosure that inure to a mutual fund pur-
chaser under the '33 Act. Id. at 211.
" Id. at 211-12. The United Benefit Court stressed the Joiner Court's premise that
courts should look to promoters' public representations of an offering as evidence of an
investment's character in commerce. Id. at 211. The Court noted that mutual funds are
investment contracts featuring growth through professionally managed investment. Id.
Because United represented the Flexible Fund as an investment alternative to mutual funds,
the Court determined that the fund exhibited the investment contract characteristics of
a mutual fund. Id.
I See SEC v. United Benefits Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 202, 211-12 (1967) (optional annuity
fund's character in commerce ascertained by looking to terms of offer and promoters' public
representations of the offer); supra text accompanying notes 60-64 (United Benefit Court's
investment contract analysis).
455 U.S. 551 (1982).
67 Id. at 559-60; see supra text accompanying notes 22-30 (Joiner establishes instruc-
tions and factors for courts considering security status of instrument or interest under
economic realities test); supra text accompanying notes 54-56 (Howey test for determining
whether instrument or interest constitutes investment contract).
" 455 U.S. at 553; see supra notes 41-49 and accompanying text (applying economic
realities test to Weaver certificate of deposit).
11 455 U.S. at 553. Although Marine Bank officers told the Weavers that the $65,000
loan for Columbus Packing was for working capital, the bank kept over $2,000 to satisfy
Columbus' overdue obligations. Id. The remaining funds went to pay taxes and other creditors.
Id. The bank then refused Columbus any credit on the company's checking account and
Columbus declared bankruptcy four months later. Id. The bank acknowledged an intention
to claim the Weavers' pledged certificate of deposit to satisfy part of the Columbus loan.
Id. The Weavers alleged that the bank solicited the couple to guaranty the Columbus loan
without disclosing Columbus' financial condition. Id.
70 Id. at 559-60; see supra note 69 (terms of loan guaranty between Weavers and Col-
umbus Packing); infra notes 73-76 and accompanying text (loan guaranty terms agreed to
by Weavers and Columbus Packing).
71 See SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 294-95, 299-300 (1946) (citrus grove sale
and service offer exhibiting investment contract security characteristics); see supra notes
52-56 and accompanying text (establishing Howey test for determining whether instrument
or interest constitutes investment contract).
7 See SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 345-52 (1943) (assignment of
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The Weaver Court found that unlike the instruments in Howey and Joiner,
the Weavers' loan guaranty agreement had no equivalent value for public
trading." Although Columbus Packing was to pay the Weavers fifty per-
cent of the company's net profits,74 the Court held that a share of the
profits was an insufficient economic inducement to make the loan guaranty
agreement a security.7 Additionally, the Weaver Court held that because
the Weavers could veto future loans to Columbus Packing, the couple re-
tained a measure of control over the agreement that was uncharacteristic
of a security.' Having found that the Weaver loan guaranty was not an
investment contract, the Court reaffirmed a commitment to a functional,
economic realities approach for analyzing the definition of a security.7
The Court stated that courts must analyze and evaluate each transaction
upon the basis of the content of the instrument," the purposes of the Acts,7
and the factual setting of the case. 0
After Weaver, the economic realities approach encompasses a wide
range of factors that courts may consider in determining an instrument's
or interest's security status."' Courts must consider the substance, rather
than the form, of an instrument or interest to determine whether the in-
strument or interest exhibits the characteristics of a security.2 Courts,
however, may consider some or all of the factors listed in Joiner and Howey
oil leases on undertaking to drill well falls within ordinary concept of security); see supra
notes 22-30 and accompanying text (Joiner Court's instructions and factors to consider for
determining whether instrument or interest exhibits characteristics of security under
economic realities test).
" 455 U.S. at 559.
" Id. at 553, 560. In addition to guarantying the Weavers a portion of Columbus' pro-
fits, the loan guaranty agreement between the Weavers and Columbus Packing gave the
Weavers the right to use Columbus' barn and pasture. Id. at 553, 560.
, Id. at 560. Although the Court held that the Weavers' share of the packing com-
pany's profits was an insufficient economic inducment to confer security status upon the
agreement between the couple and the packing company, the Court did not elaborate upon
the sufficiency of profits necessary to find an investment contract. Id.
" Id. The Weaver Court did not elaborate upon the permissible level of control an
investor may retain in an investment contract. Id.; see infra notes 91-115 (courts' differing
opinions about measure of control investors may retain in investment contract).
' 455 U.S. at 560 n.11.
" Id. at 556, 560 n.11; see supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text (Joiner test for
determining instrument's character in commerce by scrutinizing the instrument's context).
," 455 U.S. 551, 560 n.11; see supra note 23 (purpose of Acts).
' 455 U.S. 551, 560 n.11; see supra note 24 (,oiner emphasis that courts must consider
context of transaction); supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text (Forman emphasis that
courts consider economic realities of instrument's substance rather than form of instrument).
8, See infra text accompanying notes 82-91 (combined Joiner and Howey factors pro-
vide wide range for courts following economic realities approach for interpreting definition
of security).
See United Hous. Found. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837,849-50 (1975) (emphasizing economic
realities); supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text (Forman Court's emphasis that courts




to ascertain an instrument's or interest's character in commerce." Courts
applying the Joiner test to an instrument or interest look to the terms
of offer,' plan of distribution," and economic inducements offered to the
public." Courts applying the Howey test to an instrument or interest look
for an investment of money, goods, or services,87 for a common enter-
' See Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 555-56 (1982) (definition of security in-
cludes instruments or interests bearing characteristics of a security under either the Howey
investment contract test or the Joiner test); SEC V. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99,
301 (1946) (Howey investment contract test requires that instrument or interest involves
investment in common enterprise with profits derived solely from efforts of others); SEC
v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 350-53 (1943) (Joiner test for ascertaining instru-
ment's or interest's character in commerce focuses upon terms of offer, plan of distribution,
and economic inducements offered to the public).
11 See SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 352-53 (1943) (first factor for
determining whether instrument's character in commerce falls within ordinary concept of
security); supra text accompanying notes 28-30 (Joiner factors for ascertaining instrument's
or interest's character in commerce); see also Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 553
(1982) (terms of offer between Weavers and Columbus Packing Company); supra notes 68-69,
74-76 and accompanying text (terms of Weaver certificate of deposit and loan guaranty
agreement).
I See 320 U.S. at 352-53 (Joiner's second factor for determining whether instrument
exhibits characteristics of a security); supra text accompanying notes 28-30 (Joiner factors
for determining instrument's or interest's character in commerce); see also Marine Bank
v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 560 (1982) (Weaver agreement not for public distribution); supra
text accompanying note 73 (Weaver agreement did not display characteristics of security
because agreement did not involve public offering).
' See 320 U.S. at 352-53 (Joiner's third factor ascertaining whether instrument's or
interest's character in commerce falls within ordinary concept of security); supra text
accompanying notes 28-30 (Joiner factors for determining instrument's or interest's character
in commerce); see also Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 560 (1982) (economic inducements
for Weaver agreement were not characteristic of a security); supra notes 74-75 and accompany-
ing text (Weaver agreement's economic inducements were a share of packing company pro-
fits and use of barn and pastures).
I See SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99, 301 (1946) (first element of invest-
ment contract test); supra text accompanying notes 54-56 (Howey test for determining whether
instrument or interest constitutes investment contract). After the Howey Court stated that
the definition of an investment contract required an investment of money, the Supreme
Court later extended the money requirement to an investment of goods or services. See
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 560 n.12 (1979) (dicta) (investment
does not have to take form of cash only).
Some courts have developed a "commercial-investment" test to evaluate the context
of an investment. See Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 463 F.2d 1075, 1078-79 (7th Cir.) (for-
mulation of commercial-investment test), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009 (1972); see also National
Bank of Commerce v. All Am. Assurance Co., 583 F.2d 1295, 1296-97, 1301 (5th Cir. 1978)
(promissory note pledging securities as collateral not security under commercial-investment
test). Under the commercial-investment test, if a transaction's context is commercial, rather
than investment, courts find that the transaction does not involve a security. See, e.g., Sut-
ter v. Groen, 687 F.2d 197, 200-04 (7th Cir. 1982) (rebuttable presumption that purchase
of 50% or more of corporation's stock is commercial venture, not investment venture);
National Bank of Commerce v. All Am. Assurance Co., 583 F.2d at 1296-97, 1301 (promissory
note pledging securities as collateral is commercial, not investment, transaction); Cocklereece
v. Moran, [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,482, at 92,814-18 (N.D. Ga. Jan.
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prise,s" and for profits derived from the efforts of others8 9 Along with
the factors listed in Joiner and Howey, courts also may consider the Weaver
Court's emphasis upon the purposes of the federal securities statutes."
Additionally, Weaver suggests that courts interpreting the Howey test's
"efforts of others" requirement may consider the measure of control re-
tained by an investor in an investment contract.9
OIL, GAS, AND OTHER MINERAL INTERESTS
One area of security definition cases in which an investor's measure
27, 1982) (use of loan to acquire stock is commercial, not investment transaction).
Although not specifically following the Howey test, the "risk capital" test interprets
whether purchasers made an investment in a security according to the degree of risk in-
volved. See Amfac Mortgage Corp. v. Arizona Mall of Tempe, 583 F.2d 426, 431-32 (9th Cir.
1978) (application of risk capital test to promissory note); Great W. Bank & Trust v. Kotz,
532 F.2d 1252, 1257 (9th Cir. 1976) (establishing risk capital test); see also American Bank
and Trust Co. v. Wallace, [Current Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,118, at
95,358-62 (6th Cir., Mar. 10, 1983) (applying risk capital test and Howey test to promissory
note); Carney & Fraser, supra note 6, at 520-45 (comparing risk capital test to Howey test).
11 See SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299, 301 (1946) (second element of Howey
test); supra text accompanying notes 54-56 (Howey investment contract test). The Supreme
Court has not clarified further the Howey test's common enterprise element. Dillport, supra
note 4, at 105, 105 n.20. Lower federal courts have adopted either a horizontal commonality
test or a vertical commonality test to determine whether a common enterprise exists. Id.
at 105 n.20; see infra notes 130-33 and accompanying text (defining horizontal and vertical
commonality tests).
I See SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946) (third element of Howey
test); supra text accompanying notes 54-56 (Howey investment contract test). The Supreme
Court considered the Howey test's "efforts of others" element in United Housing Founda-
tion v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852, 852 n.16 (1975). The Forman Court noted that profits
from an investment contract do not have to result solely from the efforts of others, but
realistically also may include profits from other schemes that involve securities in substance.
Id. at 852 n.16.
Also eschewing a strict interpretation of "solely," the Ninth Circuit stresses whether
the efforts made by those other than the investor are undeniably significant efforts, essen-
tial to the success or failure of the enterprise. See SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises,
Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir.) (although investment efforts need not be "solely" the ef-
forts of others, efforts of others must be significant to comply with Howey test), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 821 (1973); see also Kim v. Cochenour, 687 F.2d 210, 213 n.7 (7th Cir. 1982) (rejecting
strict interpretation of Howey's solely requirement); Martin v. T.V. Tempo, Inc., 628 F.2d
887, 889 (5th Cir. 1980) (adopting Ninth Circuit's interpretation of "solely" requirement);
Crowley v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 570 F.2d 875, 877 (10th Cir. 1975) (following Glenn
v. Turner interpretation of "solely" requirement); cf. infra notes 91, 110-15 and accompany-
ing text (Weaver opens opportunity for courts interpreting Howey Court's "efforts of others"
requirement to examine efforts of investors).
11 See Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 555-56, 560 n.11 (1982) (Congress did not
intend for federal securities laws to act as broad federal remedy for all fraud, but only
for fraud involving securities law violations); supra note 23 (purpose of the '33 and '34 Acts).
91 See Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 560 (1982) (investor's measure of control
over investment may affect security status); see also infra notes 93-115 and accompanying




of control may have an impact is in oil, gas, and mineral interest cases.2
Courts have reached differing results when considering whether an in-
vestor's retention or exercise of control precludes an oil, gas, or other
mineral interest from constituting an investment contract.93 Before Weaver,
the Tenth Circuit refused to find an investment contract because of rights
retained by a purchaser of oil and gas leases.94 In Ballard & Cordell Corp.
v. Zoller & Danneberg Exploration, Ltd., 5 the Tenth Circuit considered
whether an operating agreement between a purchaser of an oil and gas
interest and an independent operator created an investment contract.'
The Ballard & Cordell court determined that the purchaser did not rely
solely upon the efforts of others because the purchaser was heavily in-
volved in the drilling operation, was an informed purchaser, and was
I See infra text accompanying notes 93-115 (measure of control retained or exercised
by investor may effect creation of security); see also 15 U.S.C. 5 77b(1) (1976) ('33 Act defini-
tion of security includes fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or mineral rights). A frac-
tional undivided interest is a fractional part of an entire interest that is undivided because
the holders of the interest are tenants in common, rather than joint tenants. See Woodward
v. Wright, 266 F.2d 108, 114-15 (10th Cir. 1959) (explaining fractional undivided interest).
supra note 3 ('34 Act definition of security includes oil, gas, and other mineral interests).
" Compare Ballard & Cordell Corp. v. Zoller & Danneburg Exploration, Ltd., 544 F.2d
1059, 1065 (10th Cir. 1976) (purchaser's involvement in managerial decisions and retention
of right to withhold consent for new drilling and remedial work precluded oil and gas lease
operating agreement from constituting investment contract because purchaser did not rely
solely upon the efforts of drilling operator), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 965 (1977) with Parvin
v. Davis Oil Co., 524 F.2d 112, 115-16, 116 n.2 (9th Cir. 1975) (oil and gas drilling venture
constituted investment contract because investor did not have essential managerial rights,
although investor made some operational decisions) and Johnsen v. Rogers, [Current Transfer
Binder] FED.SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,072, at 95,085-86 (C.D. CaL, Nov. 1, 1982) (although in-
vestors retained right to determine preliminary drilling decisions, drilling operator made
significant managerial decisions effecting success or failure of oil and gas investment con-
tract). But cf. Nor-Tex Agencies v. Jones, 482 F.2d 1093, 1097-99 (5th Cir. 1973) (investment
contract exists even if investors retain right to make major managerial decisions, but in-
stead passively rely upon efforts of only one investor among the group to manage oil and
gas interests), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977 (1974).
" See Ballard & Cordell Corp. v. Zoller & Danneberg Exploration, Ltd., 544 F.2d 1059,
1065 (10th Cir. 1976) (rights retained by purchaser may preclude investment contract status
for oil and gas lease operating agreement), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 965 (1977).
95 Id.
9 Id. In Ballard & Cordell, Ballard & Cordell Corporation (Ballard & Cordell) contracted
with Zoller & Danneberg Investments (ZDI) to sell a 50% working interest in two oil and
gas lease units in Oklahoma. Id. at 1061; see Lynn v. Caraway, 252 F. Supp. 858, 860-61
(W.D. La. 1966) (defining working interest) affd, 379 F.2d 943, 944-45 (5th Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 951 (1968). Generally in an oil and gas lease, a lessor-landowner retains
a 1/8th interest in the leased property and a lessee retains a 7/8th interest, which is termed
the "working interest." 252 F. Supp. at 861. A working interest and an "interest in an oil
and gas lease" are substantially synonymous terms in oil and gas transaction cases. 379
F.2d at 944 n.1. Under the contract in Ballard & Cordell, ZDI negotiated an operating agree-
ment with Ballard & Cordell. 544 F.2d at 1061-62. Although Ballard & Cordell had assigned
a 50% working interest to ZDI, ZDI later refused to purchase the interests in the two
oil and lease units. Id. Ballard & Cordell brought suit for breach of contract and ZDI brought
a counterclaim for securities violations. Id. at 1060-62.
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familiar with oil and gas lease operations.' The court held that the transfer
of interest" did not constitute an investment contract under the Howey
test because the purchaser retained the right to withhold consent for in-
curring expenses for drilling new wells or for performing remedial work
on existing wells.'
Although not strictly applying the Howey test, the Ninth Circuit has
found that rights retained by an investor in oil and gas drilling ventures
may not prevent the creation of an investment contract."' In Parvin v.
Davis Oil Co.," the Ninth Circuit determined that an investor retained
operational rights, but did not retain the right to make major managerial
decisions.1 Although the investor had some previous experience in oil
and gas ventures, others involved in the Parvin venture selected the leases
for proposed investment, the sites for drilling, when to commence drill-
ing, and the exploration operations for each site. ' a The Parvin court con-
544 F.2d at 1061-62, 1065. In Ballard & Cordell, the Tenth Circuit noted that during
negotiations between Ballard & Cordell and ZDI, ZDI received information about the oil
and gas leases from Ballard & Cordell. Id. at 1061-62. Although ZDI did not request addi-
tional information from Ballard & Cordell, ZDI obtained further information about the leases
from an outside consultant. Id. at 1062. The Tenth Circuit also noted that ZDI was ex-
perienced in oil and gas lease operations and drilling. Id. at 1061, 1065.
" Id. at 1063-65. In addition to considering whether the Ballard & Cordell working
interest in two oil and gas leases was an investment contract, the Tenth Circuit considered
whether the interest constituted a security as a fractional undivided interest. Id. at 1063-64;
see supra notes 2 & 3 ('33 Act and '34 Act definitions of security include fractional undivided
interests in oil, gas, or other mineral rights). The court determined that although the 50%
working interest was a fractional part of a entire lease interest, Ballard & Cordell offered
the 50% working interest to ZDI as a whole interest, not as a fractional interest. 544 F.2d
at 1063-64. Therefore, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the 50% working interest was not
a security because the interest was not split into fractional units for speculative offering.
Id.; see text accompanying notes 116-25 (discussing fractional, undivided interest in oil, gas,
or other minerals).
" 544 F.2d at 1065. In addition to determining that the Ballard & Cordell operating
agreement did not meet the "efforts of others" requirement of the Howey test, the Tenth
Circuit also determined that the agreement lacked the Howey test's "common enterprise"
element. Id.; see SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299-301 (1946) (establishing Howey
test to determine whether interest or instrument constitutes an investment contract and
is therefore a security); supra text accompanying notes 54-56 (listing elements of Howey
test). The Ballard & Cordell court stated that the agreement merely transferred leasehold
rights from Ballard & Cordell to ZDI and did not create a common enterprise between
the two companies. 544 F.2d at 1065.
10 See Parvin v. Davis Oil Co., 524 F.2d 112, 115-16, 116 n.2 (9th Cir. 1975) (oil and
gas leases coupled with exploration operation constituted investment contract even though
investor retained right to make some operational decisions).
101 Id.
102 Id. at 116. In Parvin, Davis Oil Company (Davis) and Parvin, an investor in oil and
gas properties, entered into three drilling ventures. Id. at 114-15. Although Parvin could
refrain from joining in any of the ventures, could determine the extent of his own invest-
ment in a venture, and could question the details of each venture, Davis made the major
operational decisions for each venture. Id. at 115-16; see infra text accompanying note 103
(major decisions made by Davis).
10 524 F.2d at 116.
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cluded that the oil and gas drilling venture agreement was an investment
contract because the investor was dependent upon others to make deci-
sions that affected the success or failure of the venture. 4 In 1982, the
District Court for the Central District of California similarly concluded
that an oil and gas turnkey drilling contract' 5 constituted an investment
contract even though investors retained the right to decide when to drill
and who should do the drilling. 6 In Johnsen v. Rogers,17 the district court
found that the turnkey drilling contract constituted an investment con-
tract because the drilling contractors had the exclusive management,
development, and operation of the leasehold. 18 The Johnsen court held
that the drilling contractor, not the investors, made undeniably signifi-
cant efforts affecting the profits derived from the leasehold.' Although
' Id. The Parvin court followed the Ninth Circuit's test for an investment contract
established in SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises. Id. at 115-16; see SEC v. Glenn W. Turner
Enter., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir.) (interpreting investment contract test as stressing
significance of efforts by persons other than the investor), cert denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973).
In Glenn W. Turner, the Ninth Circuit held that a strict interpretation of the world "solely"
in the Howey investment contract test could allow promoters to circumvent federal securities
laws by requiring investors to contribute nominal efforts to derive profits. 474 F.2d at 482;
see SEC v. WJ. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299-301 (1946) (Howey investment contract test);
supra text accompanying notes 54-56 (listing elements of Howey test). The Glenn W. Turner
court concluded that an investment contract determination rests upon whether the efforts
by persons other than the investors are the significant managerial duties which affect the
success or failure of the enterprise. 474 F.2d at 482. The Paroin court determined that
Davis made the essential managerial decisions affecting the success or failure of the Parvin-
Davis ventures because Davis selected leases, sites, drilling times, and exploration activities
for each venture. 524 F.2d at 116 & n.2.
103 See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1359 (5th ed. 1979). A turnkey contract in the oil drilling
industry occurs when a driller of an oil well undertakes to furnish everything, does all
work required, places the well on production, and turns the well over ready to turn the
key and start oil running into tanks. Id.
11 See Johnsen v. Rogers, [Current Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,072,
at 95,085-86 (C.D. Cal., Nov. 1, 1982) (investment contract status not precluded by investors'
retention of right to make initial determinations of oil and gas leaseholds and drilling and
operation contracts).
10, [Current Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,072 (C.D. Cal., Nov. 1, 1982).
108 Id. at 95,086. In Johnsen, Oil-Gas Equipment Company, Inc. (Oil-Gas Equipment) and
the company's president Jerry Rogers sold fractional interests in oil and gas leaseholds
to investors Gordon Johnsen, Lewis Phan, and School Land Oil Company (School Land).
Id. at 95,081. Western Oil Resources, Ltd. (Western Oil) and its president James Douglas
entered into turnkey drilling and operating contracts with School Land to drill and operate
oil and gas wells on the School Land leaseholds. Id. at 95,084. Rogers and Douglas were
partners in several oil and gas wells located near the School Land leaseholds. Id. at 95,084
n.12. School Land later brought suit alleging that Oifl-Gas Equipment, Rogers, Western Oil,
and Douglas misrepresented and concealed facts about the potential productivity of the
leaseholds. Id. at 95,081.
10I Id. at 95,085-86. The Johnsen court relied upon both the Howey test and the Glenn
W. Turner court's interpretation of Howey to find that the turnkey drilling contract was
an investment contract. Id.; see SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299-301 (1946) (Howey
test determining whether instrument or interest constitutes an investment contract); SEC
v. Glenn W. Turner Enter., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir.) (interpreting Howey investment
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the Supreme Court has not considered specifically the measure of control
an investor may remain and still derive investment profits from the ef-
forts of others, the Fifth Circuit addressed the issue in Williamson v.
Tucker."'
The Williamson court considered whether powers retained by in-
vestors in a joint venture were so significant, regardless of the degree
exercised, that the investors could not have premised their investments
on a reasonable expectation of profits from others' management."' The
Fifth Circuit reasoned that if the investors had access to information about
the investment, the investors received adequate protection against depend-
ence upon others and thus, the investors retained more than nominal
control."' Accordingly, the Williamson court concluded that the investors'
retention of more than nominal control precluded security status for the
joint venture because the investors could not expect profits primarily from
the efforts of others."' Other circuits refuse to find securities when in-
contract test as requiring significant efforts by person other than investor), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 821 (1973); supra text accompanying notes 54-56 (listing elements of Howey test);
supra note 104 (Glenn W. Turner court's interpretation of Howey test). The Johnsen court
pointed out that the investors merely chose Western Oil and Douglas to drill on and operate
the School Land leaseholds. [Current Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,072, at
95,086. The court determined that under both Howey and Glenn W. Turner, the Johnsen
investors relied upon the significant efforts of Western Oil and Douglas to derive any pro-
fits from School Land's investment contract with Western Oil. Id.
10 645 F.2d 404 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981).
... Id. at 419. In Williamson v. Tucker, a group of investors engaged in several dif-
ferent joint ventures to purchase and develop real estate near the proposed Dallas/Fort
Worth Regional Airport. Id. at 407-09. Each joint venture agreement required unanimous
consent of the venturers to accomplish certain acts, such as making a mortgage, borrowing
money for the venture, or using the venture property as collateral. Id. at 408-09. The Fifth
Circuit stated that the extent to which the venturers actually exercised their powers was
unclear. Id. at 409.
Before Williamson, the Fifth Circuit had held that an investment contract may exist
where investors in oil and gas interests have the right to make managerial decisions, but
remain passive and depend upon the efforts and expertise of a single investor to manage
the venture. See Nor-Tex Agencies v. Jones, 482 F.2d 1093, 1097-99 (5th Cir. 1973) (invest-
ment contract created by sale of oil and gas interests because other investors depended
upon efforts of single investor to develop and manage drilling operations), cert. denied, 415
U.S. 977 (1974).
' 645 F.2d at 422-24. The Fifth Circuit stressed in Williamson that investors unable
to obtain sufficient information about an investment were inadequately protected from
dependence upon the efforts of others to manage the investment. Id, at 422. In addition
to inadequate access to information, the Williamson court listed other ways that an in-
vestor could be dependent upon the efforts of others. Id. at 422-24. Other means of dependence
include an irrevocable delegation of powers to a manager or promoter, dependence upon
a promoter's expertise, and investors' lack of business expertise. Id. at 422-23; see Nor-Tex
Agencies v. Jones, 482 F.2d 1093, 1099 (5th Cir. 1973) (investor's general business sophistica-
tion did not preclude protection by federal securities statutes when investor had limited
knowledge about oil and gas ventures), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977,(1974).
,,' 645 F.2d at 425.
[Vol. 40:1255
1983] DEFINING A SECURITY 1273
vestors retain a real power that they are capable of exercising.114 In the
future, an investor's retention of power may be a determining factor for
courts considering whether an oil, gas, or other mineral interest constitutes
an investment contract.
115
In addition to investment contract considerations, courts may deter-
mine whether an interest is fractional and undivided"6 to find a security
in oil, gas, and other mineral interest cases.1 1 7 The Securities and Exchange
" See Schultz v. Dain Corp., 568 F.2d 612, 614-16 (8th Cir. 1978) (purchaser's negotia-
tion of apartment management contract and delegation of powers to manager precluded
the arrangement from being a security); Ballard & Cordell Corp. v. Zoller & Danneberg
Exploration, Ltd., 544 F.2d 1059, 1063-65 (10th Cir. 1976) (investors' power over operation
of working interest in oil wells and leases foreclosed security status), cert. denied, 431 U.S.
965 (1977); Mr. Steak, Inc. v. River City Steak, Inc., 460 F.2d 666, 669 (10th Cir. 1972) (even
though franchisee did not exercise control, retention of control precluded franchise from
security status).
"I See Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 560 (1982) (Weaver Court's indication that
investors' control may foreclose security status for loan guaranty agreement); Johnsen v.
Rogers, [Current Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 99,072, at 95,085-86 (C.D. Cal.,
Nov. 1, 1982) (investors' retention of right to determine when to drill and who should drill
did not preclude oil and gas turnkey drilling contract from constituting security because
drilling contractor made undeniably significant managerial decisions); see also supra notes
95-106, 111-14 and accompanying text (cases decided before Weaver considering whether
investor's retention or exercise of power to make managerial decisions affects an instru-
ment's or interest's security status).
11 See supra notes 2 & 3 ('33 and '34 Act definitions of a security). Under the varying
interests of the '33 Act, a fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights
may be a security. See 15 U.S.C. S 77b(1) (1976) ('33 Act definition of security); supra note
2 ('33 Act). Under the varying interests of the '34 Act, a certificate of interest or participa-
tion in any oil, gas, or other mineral royalty or lease may be a security. See 15 U.S.C. S
78c(10) (1976) ('34 Act definition of a security); supra note 3 ('34 Act). An oil and gas interest
also may be a security as an investment contract under both Acts. See 15 U.S.C. SS 77b(1),
78c(10) (investment contract is security under both Acts).
117 See Ballard & Cordeil Corp. v. Zoller & Danneberg Exploration, Ltd., 544 F.2d 1059,
1063-64 (10th Cir. 1976) (contract for sale of 50% working interest in oil and gas properties
did not create security as sale of fractional undivided interest), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 965
(1977); Parvin v. Davis Oil Co., 524 F.2d 112, 115-16, 116 n.2 (9th Cir. 1975) (fractional in-
terest in oil and gas leases coupled with exploration operation constituted security); Nor-
Tex Agencies v. Jones, 482 F.2d 1093, 1098 (5th Cir. 1973) (transfer of 75% working interest
in oil and gas leases coupled with drilling operation by promoter who retained 25/0 work-
ing interest constituted fractional undivided oil and gas interests), cert. denied, 415 U.S.
977 (1974); Gilbert v. Nixon, 429 F.2d 348, 354 (10th Cir. 1970) (purchase of fractional in-
terests in oil and gas leases created securities); Lynn v. Caraway, 379 F.2d 943, 944 (5th
Cir. 1967) (sale of entire interest in oil and gas lease does not create fractional undivided
interest, even though interest sold may be fraction of larger interest); cert. denied, 393 U.S.
951 (1968); Graham v. Clark, 332 F.2d 155, 156 & n.1 (6th Cir. 1964) (sale of all of seller's
rights in oil and gas leases did not constitute fractional undivided interest, even though
seller retained '/4 working interest as consideration for sale); Moses v. Michael, 292 F.2d
614, 617-19 (5th Cir. 1961) (assignment of fractional undivided working interests in oil and
gas rights created security); Roe v. United States, 287 F.2d 435, 436-37 (5th Cir.) (sale of
entire 7/8 of mineral lease did not constitute fractional undivided interest), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 824 (1961); Woodward v. Wright, 266 F2d 108, 112, 114 (10th Cir. 1959) (contract
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Commission (SEC) has stated that the transfer of a fractional undivided
oil and gas interest is not a security when the owner transfers his entire
interest to a single person.' 8 Federal courts, however, have reached con-
flicting results in determining when a fractional undivided interest exists
under federal securities laws."' Most courts considering the transfer of
interests in oil and gas rights have offered little analysis for determining
whether a transaction involved a fractional undivided interest.120 Under
the fractional undivided interest designation, courts may follow Joiner,
the only Supreme Court case considering the security status of oil and
gas interests."'2 The Joiner Court held that the sale and assignment of
for sale of entire oil and gas lease was security because contract contemplated sale of frac-
tional interests); Johnsen v. Rogers, [Current Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
99,072, at 95,085 (C.D. Cal., Nov. 1, 1982) (sale of fractional leasehold interests coupled with
exploration contract considered fractional undivided interest in oil and gas rights); Dupler
v. Simmons, 163 F. Supp. 535, 540-41 (D. Wyo. 1958) (sale of fractional undivided interest
in oil and gas lease to finance drilling operation constituted security); Creswell-Keith, Inc.
v. Willingham, 160 F. Supp. 735, 739 (W.D. Ark. 1958) (sale of entire undivided interest
constituted security because interest sold was fractional part of larger interest), rev'd on
other grounds, 264 F.2d 76, 82 (8th Cir. 1959); Darwin v. Jess Hickey Oil Corp., 153 F. Supp.
667, 671 (N.D. Tex. 1957) (sale of entire oil and gas leasehold interest did not create secur-
ity); SEC v. McBride, 143 F. Supp. 562, 563 (M.D. Tenn. 1956) (sale of fractional undivided
interests in oil, gas, and other mineral rights constituted security); .Wall v. Wagner, 125
F. Supp. 854, 857 (D. Neb. 1954) (purchase of working interest in oil leases constituted frac-
tional undivided interest), affd sub nom. Whittaker v. Wall, 226 F.2d 868,871-72 (8th Cir. 1955).
18 SEC Securities Act Release No. 185, 11 C.F.R. 1095 (June 30, 1943), reprinted in
FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 1031 at 2057-58.
.. Compare Ballard & Cordell Corp. v. Zoller & Danneberg Exploration, Ltd., 544 F.2d
1059, 1063-65 (10th Cir. 1976) (contract for sale of entire 50% working interest in oil and
gas leases did not constitute security even though contract contemplated sale of fractional
interests), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 965 (1977) and Graham v. Clark, 332 F.2d 155, 156 (6th Cir.
1964) (sale of two oil leases did not constitute security even though seller retained 1/4 work-
ing interest) with Nor-Tex Agencies, Inc. v. Jones, 482 F.2d 1093, 1095-98 (5th Cir. 1973)
(transfer of entire 75% working interest in oil and gas properties constituted security because
investors induced to speculate in fractional undivided interests), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977
(1974) and Woodward v. Wright, 266 F.2d 108, 112, 114 (10th Cir. 1959) (sale of entire oil
and gas lease constituted security because accompanying contract contemplated creation
of fractional interests).
",o See Gilbert v. Nixon, 429 F.2d 348, 354 (10th Cir. 1970) (purchase of fractional in-
terests in thirteen oil and gas leases constituted securities); Moses v. Michael, 292 F.2d
614, 617-18 (5th Cir. 1961) (transfer of fractional undivided working interests in oil and gas
rights created security); Johnsen v. Rogers, [Current Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP.
(CCH) 99,072 at 95,085 (C.D. Cal., Nov. 1, 1982) (sale of oil and gas lease coupled with
drilling operation considered fractional undivided interest); Dupler v. Simmons, 163 F. Supp.
535, 540-41 (D. Wyo. 1958) (fractional interest sold to finance oil drilling constituted secur-
ity); Wall v. Wagner, 125 F. Supp. 854, 857 (D. Neb. 1954) (purchase of working interest
in oil and gas lease created fractional undivided interest), affid sub nom. Whittaker v. Wall
226 F.2d 868, 871-72 (8th Cir. 1955).
"' See SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 352 (1943) (fractional undivided
interest in oil, gas, and other mineral rights considered method of mineral rights apportion-
ment most used for speculative purposes); see also Nor-Tex Agencies v. Jones, 482 F.2d
1093, 1098 (5th Cir. 1973) (sale of 75% working interest in oil and gas leases constituted
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oil leasehold subdivisions by parcels constituted securities.'" The Court
held that although Congress specifically included the fractional undividied
interest clause in the '33 Act because speculators most often used the
fractional undivided interest, Joiner did not preclude courts from resort-
ing to an investment contract or other approach to ascertain the security
status of oil and gas interests.' Many courts consider both a fractional
undivided interest approach and an investment contract approach in oil,
gas, and other mineral interest cases."4 Accordingly, courts may follow
both the Joiner and Howey tests in oil, gas, and mineral interest cases. 5
DISCRETIONARY TRADING ACCOUNTS
Although both Joiner and Howey supply considerations for courts
determining the security status of instruments or interests in oil, gas,
security under Joiner because investors induced to speculate in fractional undivided in-
terests), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977 (1974); Moses v. Michael, 292 F.2d 614, 618-19 (5th Cir.
1961) (assignment of fractional undivided working interest in oil and gas rights created
security under Joiner); Roe v. United States, 287 F.2d 435, 437-38, 438 n.2 (5th Cir.) (sale
of entire 7/8 interest in mineral lease did not constitute fractional undivided interest even
though circumstances indicated speculative venture under Joiner), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
824 (1961); Woodward v. Wright, 266 F.2d 108, 112, 114 (10th Cir. 1959) (contract for sale
of entire oil and gas lease was fractional undivided interest because contract contemplated
fractionalizing interests for speculative purposes under Joiner); Johnsen v. Rogers, [Cur-
rent Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,072, at 95,085 (C.D. Cal., Nov. 1,1982) (citing
Joiner as support that initial assignment of fractional oil and gas lease coupled with ex-
ploration operation constitutes fractional undivided interest).
12 320 US. 344, 352 (1943).
123 Id.
1z, See, e.g., Ballard & Cordel Corp. v. Zoller & Danneberg Exploration, Ltd., 544 F.2d
1059, 1063-65 (10th Cir. 1976) (transfer of entire leasehold right does not create security
as fractional undivided interest or as investment contract), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 965 (1977);
Parvin v. Davis Oil Co., 524 F.2d 112, 115-16, 116 n.2 (9th Cir. 1975) (fractional interests
in oil and gas leases coupled with exploration operation constitutes fractional undivided
interest and investment contract); Roe v. United States, 287 F.2d 435, 438 (5th Cir.) (sale
of entire oil lease constituted investment contract, but not fractional undivided interest),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 824 (1961); Johnsen v. Rogers, [Current Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 99,072, at 95,085-86 (C.D. Cal., Nov. 1,1982) (assignment of fractional interest
in oil and gas lease and contemporaneous drilling agreement may constitute both fractional
undivided interest and investment contract).
125 See, e.g., Ballard & Cordell Corp. v. Zoller & Danneberg Exploration, Ltd., 544 F.2d
1059, 1065 (10th Cir. 1976) (following principles of Howey and Joiner to find lack of frac-
tional undivided interest and investment contract characteristics in contract for sale of
50% working interest), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 965 (1977); Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton,
422 F.2d 1124, 1128 (4th Cir. 1970) (oil and gas production payment is unique instrument
constituting security under Howey and Joiner), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 916 (1974); Johnsen
v. Rogers, [Current Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,072, at 95,085-86 (C.D. Cal.,
Nov. 1, 1982) (Joiner and Howey support proposition that sale of leasehold coupled with
drilling agreement can be both fractional undivided interest and investment contract); Dar-
win v. Jess Hickey Oil Corp., 153 F. Supp. 667, 669-72 (N.D. Tex. 1957) (distinguishing sale
of stock shares and assignment of oil and gas leases from investment contract under Howey
and Joiner).
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and other mineral cases, Howey provides the major focus for courts con-
sidering whether discretionary trading accounts constitute securities. 2 '
A discretionary trading account is an arrangement in which an investor
deposits funds with a broker, authorizing the broker to exercise full discre-
tion over investment decisions in commodities." Courts considering
whether a discretionary trading account constitutes a security have focused
upon the investment contract interest of the '33 and '34 Acts' definition
of a security.'28
Relying upon the Howey test to determine whether a discretionary
trading account is a security, courts have developed two different views
of the Howey test's common enterprise element."9 Under the "horizontal
commonality" approach, courts focus upon investors' relationship and pool-
ing of funds."' Because the horizontal commonality approach is a restric-
tive approach, courts using the approach generally find that a discretionary
trading account has insufficient commonality to be an investment contract
security.2 ' Under the "vertical commonality" approach, courts focus upon
See infra notes 127-43 (discretionary trading account cases).
1" See Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 622 F.2d 216, 220-21 (6th Cir.
1980) (discretionary commodity account gives broker authority to buy or sell at his discre-
tion, without consulting customer) affid 102 S. Ct. 182 (1982); Note, Discretionary Trading
Accounts As Securities: Howey Revisited, 16 TULSA L.J. 334,334 (1980) (defining discretionary
trading account) [hereinafter cited as Howey Revisited]; Note, Discretionary Commodity Ac-
counts as "Securities": Applying the Howey Investment Contract Test to a New Investment
Medium, 67 GEO. L.J. 269, 269 (1978) (defining discretionary trading account as an investment
vehicle for trading in commodities futures contracts); cf. Gamble v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., [Current Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,046 at 94,987-89
(S.D.N.Y., Dec. 10, 1982) (commodities futures trading account maintained by national
brokerage firm but managed by unassociated independent agent is not discretionary account).
12 See supra notes 2 & 3 ('33 and '34 Acts' definition of security); infra notes 129-43
and accompanying text (courts considering whether discretionary trading account constitutes
investment contract security); see also Howey Revisited, supra note 127, at 33741 (discus-
sion of horizontal and vertical commonality tests used to determine common enterprise
element of Howey test).
1 Compare Kirk Agri-Research Council, Inc., 561 F.2d 96, 101 (7th Cir. 1977) ("horizon-
tal commonality" pooling of investments required for Howey "common enterprise" element)
with SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516, 522 ("vertical commonality" be-
tween investor and broker satisfies Howey "common enterprise" element).
1 See Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 622 F.2d 216, 221-25 (6th Cir.
1980) (horizontal common enterprise element exists if fortune of each discretionary trading
account investor is tied to success of overall venture) aff'd 102 S. Ct. 182 (1982); Commercial
Iron '& Metal Co. v. Bache & Co., 478 F.2d 39, 41-43 (10th Cir. 1973) (futures contract to
purchase copper not security because of lack of common enterprise between dealer and
investor), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 1229 (1981); Wasnovic v. Chicago Bd. of Trade, 352 F. Supp.
1066, 1069-70 (M.D. Pa. 1972) (individual discretionary trading account lacked horizontal
commonality that would be present if account funds originally had been commingled among
several customers), affid mem., 491 F.2d 752 (3d Cir. 1973).
1.1 See Kirk v. Agri-Research Council, Inc., 561 F.2d 96, 101 (7th Cir. 1977) (lack of pool-
ing of funds in discretionary trading account does not satisfy Howey); Milnarik v. M-S Com-
modities, Inc., 457 F.2d 274, 276-79 (7th Cir.) (investor granting discretionary authority to
1276 [Vol. 40:1255
DEFINING A SECURITY
the relationship between an investor and a promoter."3 2 Although the ver-
tical commonality approach is a flexible approach, courts using the ap-
proach have not found that a discretionary trading account has sufficient
commonality to be an investment contract security.'
The Weaver Court's use of Joiner, instead of Howey, in an investment
contract analysis has not affected courts considering whether discretionary
trading accounts constitute investment contracts."3 In 1982, the Third and
Ninth Circuits held that discretionary commodities trading accounts were
not securities under the Howey investment contract test.1 3 5 In Mordaunt
v. Incomco,"'38 the Ninth Circuit noted that a common enterprise generally
is absent from commodities futures trading accounts because the success
of a brokerage house does not correlate with the profit and loss of in-
dividual investors.'37 The Mordaunt court also noted that the mere fur-
nishing of investment counsel to an investor for a commission does not
provide a common enterprise, even when the advice is connected with
a discretionary commodities account." The Ninth Circuit additionally has
broker does not join broker's other customers in common enterprise), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
887 (1972); supra note 130 (cases using horizontal commonality approach).
1 See SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482-83 (9th Cir.)
(establishing vertical commonality approach), cerL denied, 414 U.S. 82 (1973); see also Hector
v. Weins, 533 F.2d 429, 432-34 (9th Cir. 1976) (vertical commonality necessary to satisfy
common enterprise element of investment contract); SEC v. Continental Commodity Corp.,
497 F.2d 516, 521-23 (5th Cir. 1974) (vertical commonality created by investor's reliance upon
investment counselor when success of trading enterprise is dependent upon counselor's
advice); see also Holtzman v. Proctor, Cook & Co., Inc. [Current Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 98,421 at 92,522-23 (D.C. Mass., Dec. 20,1981) (no common enterprise element
under either vertical or horizontal commonality approach).
1 See Mordaunt v. Incomco, 686 F.2d 815, 817 (9th Cir. 1982) (discretionary trading
accounts do not constitute security because investors' success or failure not directly related
to promoter's success or failure in common enterprise); Meyer v. Thomson & McKinnon
Auchincloss Kohlmeyer, Inc., 686 F.2d 818, 818-19 (9th Cir. 1982) (security "common enter-
prise" requirement not satisfied when promoter continues to profit from commissions even
when discretionary trading account loses money); Brodt v. Bache & Co., 595 F.2d 459, 460-61
(9th Cir. 1978) (vertical commonality approach to common enterprise not satisfied when
no direct relation between success or failure of promoter and investor).
1 See infra notes 135-43 and accompanying text (courts considering whether discre-
tionary trading accounts constitute investment contracts after Weaver).
.. See Mordaunt v. Incomco, 686 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1982) (discretionary commodities
trading account is not investment contract under Howey); Meyer v. Thomson & McKinnon
Auchincloss Kohlmeyer, Inc., 686 F.2d 815, 818-19 (9th Cir. 1982) (discretionary trading ac-
count does not meet Howey test's common enterprise requirement); Salcer v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,752, at
93,827-28 (3rd Cir., July 19, 1982) (discretionary commodities account does not meet Howey
test's requirement of common enterprise or pooled group of funds).
138 686 F.2d 815 (9th Cir. 1982).
1 Id. at 817. After concluding that no direct relation existed between the success of
a brokerage house and the success of an investor, the Ninth Circuit noted that the broker
in Mordaunt earned over $20,000 in commissions on the investor's account during a period
in which the investor lost over $27,000. Id.
1 Id.
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noted that a brokerage firm's practice of basing a broker's commissions
upon the percentage of assets managed for an investor does not create
the common enterprise necessary for an investment contract.'39
The Southern District of New York disregarded investment contract
considerations to hold that a commodities account, whether discretionary
or not, does not constitute a security under the federal securities laws. 4'
In Gonzalez v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc.,"' the District Court
for the Southern District of New York stated that the federal securities
laws have no application to commodities futures trading accounts because
the Commodity Exchange Act" governs futures regulation.' Steps begun
by Congress during 1982, however, might lead to changes in the securities
laws which would bring the regulation of discretionary commodities trading
accounts within the province of the SEC."" Absent a clear-cut indication
from Congress, courts may have the option of considering whether discre-
tionary trading accounts are outside the realm of federal securities laws,'
of ascertaining whether discretionary trading accounts can constitute in-
" See Meyer v. Thomson & McKinnon Auchincloss Kohlmeyer, Inc., 686 F.2d 815, 818-19
(9th Cir. 1982) (common enterprise element for investment contract does not result from
broker's receipt of commissions based upon percentage of investor's assets managed by
broker).
14 See Gonzalez v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., [1982 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,867, at 94,512-16 (S.D.N.Y., Nov. 4,1982) (securities laws do not encom-
pass regulation of commodities trading account).
" Id. at 94,513-14.
142 See 7 U.S.C. SS 1-24 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (Commodity Exchange Act of 1936).
Congress amended the Commodity Exchange Act in the Commodity Futures Trading Act
of 1974. See 7 U.S.C. SS 1-22 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (1974 Act); see also Note, The Element
of Scienter in Antifraud Provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act, 39 WASIL & LEE L. REV.
1175, 1175 n.1 (1982) (explaining concept of commodity futures trading under the Commodity
Exchange Act).
10 FED. SEC. L. REP. 98,867 at 94,513-14. In Gonzalez, the Southern District of New York
held that the federal securities laws do not apply to claims alleging a broker's mishandling
of a commodities futures trading account. Id. at 94,514.
'" See HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, H.R. REP. No. 626, 97TH CONG., 2D SESS.
1, 6-9, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2792,2796-2800 (contemplating amend-
ment to '33 Act and '34 Act to include options on securities in statutory definition of a
security). The House Committee on Energy and Commerce noted a long-standing Congres-
sional intent that the SEC has the sole authority to regulate options on all securities. H.R.
REP. No. 626 at 8-9. Traditionally, the SEC regulates markets and instruments with an underly-
ing investment purpose and the Commodity Futures Trade Commission (CFTC) regulates
markets and instruments that serve hedging and price discovery functions. See HOUSE COMM.
ON AGRICULTURE, H.R. REP. No. 626,97TH CONG., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS, 2792, 2793-94 (clarifying jurisdiction of the SEC and the definition of security).
Although the CFTC governs activities of commodities pools operations and accounts in-
volving futures, the SEC has taken the position that the federal securities laws govern
the activities of commodities pools as companies and securities issued by commodities pools.
See Letter from John S. Shad, Chairman of SEC, to Congressman Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr.,
Speaker of the House (Feb. 24, 1982) reprinted in HOUSE COMM. ON AGRICULTURE, H.R. REP.
No. 626, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. at 14-15.
11 See supra notes 140.44 and accompanying text (security status of discretionary com-
modities trading accounts may be outside the regulatory province of federal securities laws).
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vestment contracts under Howey,14 or of considering whether discretionary
trading accounts present the characteristics of a security under the Joiner
factors.
The Weaver Court's use of the Joiner factors might alleviate courts
from having to make a vertical or horizontal commonality distinction in
future discretionary trading account cases.148 Under a Joiner investment
contract analysis, courts determining whether a discretionary trading ac-
count is a security would consider whether the particular discretionary
trading account falls within the ordinary concept of a security., One fac-
tor courts would consider is the terms of offering participation in the
account."' Conceivably, more than one investor could be involved in a par-
ticular discretionary trading account, thereby circumventing the Weaver
Court's determination that a one-on-one agreement may not be a security. "'
The Weaver Court's "common trading" element, however, might present
an obstacle for finding that a discretionary trading account is an invest-
ment contract."' The Weaver Court stressed that securities should have
equivalent values to most persons and should be available for public trading
or participation."' Although a discretionary trading account is not a
publicly traded instrument or interest, the account does provide a way
for investors to participate in the public trading of instruments or
interests.TM For a court to conclude that a discretionary trading account
constituted a security under Joiner, the court would have to find that
use of the account exhibited speculative purposes characteristic of a
security." The jump from finding that an interest or instrument is the
subject of speculation to finding that a discretionary trading account is
the subject of speculation, however, may be too long a leap for courts
to take, regardless of Weaver."-8
"' See supra text accompanying notes 128-139 (courts considering whether discretionary
trading account constitutes security under Howey investment contract test).
"I See infra text accompanying notes 148-56 (considering whether discretionary trading
account may constitute security under Joiner factors).
"4 See infra text accompanying notes 149-56 (discussing discretionary trading accounts
under a Weaver investment contract analysis applying Joiner's factors).
11 455 US. at 556, 560.
"- Id. at 560.
"I See id. (unique one-to-one agreement forecloses security status).
1 2 See id. (no common trading in Weaver's loan guaranty agreement).
153 Id.
154 See supra note 127 (defining discretionary trading account as providing way for in-
vestors to trade in commodities futures through aid of broker).
"' See SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 351-52, 352 n.10 (1943) (once
instruments or interests become subject of speculative transactions, the instruments or
interests become securities); see also supra note 144 (regulatory province of SEC covers
markets and instruments with an underlying investment purpose).
" See Mordaunt v. Incomco, 686 F.2d 815, 817 (9th Cir. 1982) (merely furnishing invest-
ment advice to investor for commission does not create common enterprise element necessary
for discretionary trading account arrangement between broker and investor to constitute
investment contract security).
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THE SALE OF BUSINESS DOCTRINE
Difficulty in determining Weaver's effect upon an investment contract
analysis has occurred in cases considering whether stock transferred dur-
ing the sale of a business constitutes a security."5 7 Courts considering
whether stock in a closely-held business corporation is a security reached
differing results before the Supreme Court's Weaver decision." If a
transfer of stock occurred during the "sale of a business," some courts
refused to consider the stock a security."9 Courts following the sale of
business approach used the Howey test.16 A number of courts, however,
rejected the sale of business doctrine and followed the literal approach
for instruments that were securities in the ordinary sense."1 If an instru-
ment displayed characteristics commonly associated with stock, courts con-
sidered the stock a security. 6' Courts following the literal approach ap-
plied the Howey test only where an instrument contained unique features
difficult to classify by ordinary standards."6
I" See Seagrave Corp. v. Vista Resources, 696 F.2d 227, 230-31 (2d Cir. 1982) (following
the Joiner analysis used by Weaver, but citing Weaver only for context test); Sutter v. Groen,
687 F.2d 197, 200-04 (7th Cir. 1982) (Weaver supports "sale of business" doctrine); Golden
v. Garafalo, 678 F.2d 1139, 1140 (2d Cir. 1982) (Weaver supports rejection of sale of business
doctrine).
11 See Comment, Securities Regulation-Is Stock A Security?, 30 KAN. L. REv. 117,123-29
(1981) (discussing lower federal court decisions considering whether stock is a security);
compare Frederiksen v. Poloway, 637 F.2d 1147, 1151-54 (7th Cir.) (stock in closely held
business corporation is not security), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1017 (1981) uith Coffin v. Polishing
Machines, 596 F.2d 1202, 1204 (4th Cir. 1979) (stock in closely held business corporation
is a security), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 868 (1980).
"9 See Frederiksen v. Poloway, 637 F.2d 1147, 1151-54 (7th Cir.) (stock is not security
if sale of stock is to acquire business), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1017 (1981); Chandler v. Kew,
Inc., [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,966, at 96,054 (10th Cir. 1977) (stock
sold in transfer of business ownership is not security); Bula v. Mansfield, [1979 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,964, at 96,051-52 (D. Colo., May 13,1977) (stock is not securi-
ty when sold to transfer business ownership).
" See Frederiksen v. Poloway, 637 F.2d 1147, 1151-54 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S.
1017 (1981) (applying Howey to stock in sale of business); Chandler v. Kew, Inc., [1979 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,966 at 96,054 (10th Cir. 1977) (applying Howey to sale of
stock to transfer ownership of business;, Bula v. Mansfield, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED.
.SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 96,964 at 96,051-52 (D. Colo., May 13, 1977) (applying Howey under sale
of business).
"' See Glick v. Campagna, 613 F.2d 31, 35 (3d Cir. 1979) (sale of business doctrine inap-
plicable); Coffin v. Polishing Machines, 596 F.2d 1202, 1204 (4th Cir. 1979) (rejecting sale
of business doctrine), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 868 (1980); Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Pat Ryan
& Assoc., 496 F.2d 1255, 1261-63 (4th Cir.) (stock is security during sale of business), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1024 (1974).
16 See United Hous. Found. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 847-48 (1975) (Congress intended
definition of security to be sufficiently broad to cover instruments commercial world com-
monly considers securities); supra note 161 (cases considering stock a security under Howey
test).
16 See supra note 129 (Howey test applied to stock only in unique circumstances); text
accompanying notes 28-33 (discussing Howey); see also Bronstein v. Bronstein, 407 F. Supp.
925, 929 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (sale of stock in family corporation to brother constituted security).
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After the Weaver decision, the Second Circuit rejected the sale of
business doctrine to hold that conventional stock in a business corpora-
tion is a security." In Golden v. Garafalo,'1 the Second Circuit considered
whether corporate stock was a security as a 100 percent purchase of shares
in a ticket brokerage business." The Golden court first stated that Howey,
Joiner, and Weaver emphasized changes in an investment, rather than
changes in a particular transaction involving the instrument. 7 In addi-
tion, the Golden court noted that Weaver supported the conclusion that
the Howey test should apply only to unique or idiosyncratic instruments."8
Finally, the Golden court determined that the Joiner factors, as used in
Weaver, apply to specific terms falling within the ordinary concept of a
security.'69 The Second Circuit concluded that the Goldens' stock was a
conventional stock within the ordinary concept of a security.70 The Sec-
ond Circuit later reaffirmed the Golden approach to stock transferred dur-
ing the sale of a business. 7 ' The Fourth and Third Circuits also have found
that stock transferred during the sale of a business constitutes a security.'
The Seventh Circuit, however, reached a different conclusion for a
100 percent sale of common stock in Sutter v. Groen. The Sutter court
stated that Weaver supports the sale of business doctrine by adding the
context factor and a congressional intent factor to the ordinary concept
of a security test.' The Sutter court further stated that under the sale
of business doctrine whether an instrument is a security will depend upon
whether the purchaser is an investor or an entrepreneur.' The Sutter
'U See Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F.2d 1139, 1140 (2d Cir. 1982) (rejecting sale of business
doctrine considerations for conventional stock).
1i 678 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1982).
' Id. at 1140.
117 Id. at 1143; see Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 556-59 (1982) (Weaver analysis
of specific term under the Act); United Hous. Found. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 848-49 (1975)
(Forman analysis of specific term); SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299-301 (1946)
(Howey analysis of investment contract or unusual instrument).
'e 678 F.2d at 1144; see Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 556-59 (1982) (analyzing
specific term); United Hous. Found. v. Forman, 421 US. 837, 848-49 (1975) (specific term
analysis); SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299-301 (1946) (investment contract or unusual
instrument analysis).
"' 678 F.2d at 1144; see Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 556-59 (1982) (specific
term analysis); United Hous. Found. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 848-49 (1975) (specific term
analysis).
7 678 F.2d at 1144.
171 See Seagrave Corp. v. Vista Resources, 696 F.2d 227, 230-31 (2d Cir. 1982) (reaffirm-
ing Garafalo's rejection of sale of business doctrine).
"' See Glick v. Campagna, 613 F.2d 31, 35 (3d Cir. 1980) (sale of 500/s of stock constituted
sale of security); Coffin v. Polishing Machines, 596 F.2d 1202, 1204 (4th Cir.) (federal securities
laws apply to 100% sale of corporate stock), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 868 (1979).
' 687 F.2d 197, 200-04 (7th Cir. 1982).
" Id. at 200-01; see Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 451, 556 (1982) (context and
legislative intent tests).
1" 687 F.2d at 201-04; see supra note 87 (discussing commercial-investment test).
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court added that once a purchaser obtains more than fifty percent of a
corporation's stock, a rebuttable presumption exists that the purchaser
is an entrepreneur who is buying the business for commercial purposes,
rather than an investor.18 The Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits
follow the Sutter court's approach to stock transferred during the sale
of a business.1"
THE ECONOMIC REALITIES TEST AFTER
MARINE BANK v. WEAVER
Differing opinions about Weaver's effect on the security status of in-
struments or interests may add to definitional confusion as courts decide
to limit Weaver'78 or to view Weaver as expanding the economic realities
approach for interpreting the definition of a security."9 Courts viewing
Weaver as a broader approach may find that considering the economic
realities surrounding each instrument, interest, or transaction guarantees
only uncertain results.8 ' A court's willingness to apply all or some of the
factors that Weaver stresses as available for ascertaining the
characteristics of a security'' well may depend upon whether an instru-
17 687 F2d at 203-04.
177 See King v. Winkler, 673 F.2d 342, 344-46 (11th Cir. 1982) (rejecting sale of business
doctrine); Frederiksen v. Poloway, 637 F.2d 1147, 1151-54 (7th Cir.}, cert. denied, 451 U.S.
1017 (1981) (sale of stock to acquire business does not constitute security); Chandler v. Kew,
Inc., [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,966, at 96,054 (10th Cir., April 19,
1977) (stock not security during sale of business); see also Seldin, When Is Stock Not A Security:
The "Sale of Business Doctrine" Under the Federal Securities Laws, 37 Bus. LAw. 637, 637-50
(1982) (examining diversity of opinions among courts considering the security status of stock
transferred during sale of a business).
178 See Seagrave Corp. v. Vista Resources, Inc., 697 F.2d 227, 230 (2d Cir. 1982) (citing
Weaver for proposition that instrument seemingly within expansive definition of security
may not be security if "context otherwise requires"); Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F.2d 1139,
1143-44 (2d Cir. 1982) (Weaver treats determination of instrument's security status as a deter-
mination that does not vary according to holdings of parties or parties' intentions for par-
ticular transaction); see also Wolf v. Banco National De Mexico, 14 FED. SEC. & L. REP. (BNA)
1889, 1889-90 (N.D. Cal., Oct. 26, 1982) (Weaver limited to domestic certificates of deposit,
and does not apply to time deposits in Mexican bank).
"' See A.G. Becker, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors, 693 F.2d 136, 147 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (Weaver
court's focus is upon potential economic gains and losses of investors who are intended
beneficiaries of federal securities regulation); Sutter v. Groen, 687 F.2d 197, 200-01 (7th
Cir. 1982) (Weaver urges courts to consider economic context of each case with regard to
legislative purpose of protecting investor through federal securities laws); see also supra
notes 20-91 and accompanying text (tracing development of economic realities approach
to interpreting definition of security).
1" See supra text accompanying notes 93-125 (varying results for courts considering
whether oil, gas, or other mineral interests constitute securities); supra text accompanying
notes 158-77 (varying results among courts considering whether stock transferred during
sale of business constitutes security).
"81 See supra text accompanying notes 81-91 (factors that Weaver Court stated may
be pertinent for courts interpreting definition of security).
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ment, interest, or transaction becomes so speculative that denying security
status would circumvent the purpose of the federal securities laws.18
ROBIN JACKSON ALLEN
11 See Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 556-560, 560 n.11 (1982) (definition of security
is broad to facilitate protection of investors as context of each case requires); SEC v. C.M.
Joiner Leasing Corp, 320 U.S. 344,351-52, 352 n.10 (1943) (federal securities laws designed
to encompass interests that become subject of speculation which may harm public through
fraud); Dillport, supra note 4, at 137-40 (Weaver provides step toward interpreting defini-
tion of security to conform with purpose of federal securities laws); supra note 23 (detailing
presidential and congressional intent for purpose of federal securities laws); see also supra
text accompanying note 144 (discretionary trading accounts may not fall within purpose
or regulatory domain of federal securities laws). But see, Arnold, Marine Bank v. Weaver:
New Guidance On What Is Not A Security, 53 OKLA. B.J. 2199, 2204 (1982) (Weaver leaves
parties to unusual, negotiated transactions without protection under federal securities laws).
1983] 1283

